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Abstract: 
While the PBRF round and the associated funding is helping to recognise and increase 
the status of research, it also runs the risks of promoting the amount rather than the 
quality of research, moving further away from academic collegiality and towards 
corporate models of management, and allowing some universities to prosper at the 
expense of others. It also devalues other aspects of university scholarship to the 
potential cost of students. 
 
Call me an academic snob.  But my favourite scene in A Beautiful Mind was the one 
where Russell Crowe’s character, John Nash, was summoned to the Dean’s office and 
called to account for being unproductive while all his fellow graduate students had 
been churning out publications.  Nash, a brilliant mathematician who was later to 
receive a Nobel Prize for his concept of equilibrium in noncooperative games, replied 
that he had yet to come up with any new idea that was worth publishing. 
 
Woe betide any scholar who takes that attitude to her research outputs in the new 
environment of the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF).  This scheme is being 
established with the purpose of assessing the research performances of New Zealand 
universities in order to provide a basis for determining the level of government 
funding each will receive.  Institutional funding is determined by aggregating the 
assessed research portfolios of the individual employees of each university.  On the 
basis of their aggregated scores, university league tables are generated with the 
highest being deemed the most prestigious and attracting the most research funding. 
 
There is some merit in the argument that the PBRF is a long-overdue mechanism for 
making academics, individually and at an institutional level, accountable for what is a 
significant part of their work.  However, questions need to be posed in relation to 
some of the epistemological assumptions within the PBRF, the impact of the PBRF 
on the relative status of New Zealand universities and academics within them, and the 
implications that the PBRF league tables have for students. 
 
The PBRF raises interesting questions about the nature of knowledge itself; the 
subject matter of philosophy of science.  This is not a field of study that overflows 
lecture theatres or lends itself to expensive research projects, but it has contributed at 
least one useful concept to everyday language - paradigm.  
 
In the 1960s, Thomas Kuhn argued that human understanding progresses not through 
an accumulation of knowledge, but through intellectually violent ruptures with the 
widely accepted beliefs and practices of mainstream research.  He referred to these 
scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts.  In between these moments of breakthrough, 
Kuhn argued, much of what passes for research is mundane and formulaic and of little 
value. 
 
The PBRF will reinforce the publish-or-perish dynamic and this will lead to an 
increase in research outputs. There will almost certainly be a proliferation of 
academic journals making it more possible for academics to increase their 
publications.  But will it do anything to foster the flashes of brilliance that produce 
radical advances in the ways we understand the world?  The panels that assess the 
individual research portfolios are charged with making judgements on the quality, and 
not just the quantity of research outputs, and they also consider peer esteem and 
contributions to the research environment. 
 
However, the pressure will be on academics to be as prolific as possible, and to tailor 
their research activities to meet PBRF criteria.  One implication of this is that 
academics will have growing incentives to follow intellectual fashions, and may be 
less likely to challenge prevailing orthodoxy.  This carries the risk of impeding 
independent, radical thought.  Care needs to be taken to ensure that the PBRF does 
not reward the dull but diligent, while overlooking or even obstructing the erratic 
genius, the future John Nash. 
 
 
The PBRF is part of a broader government strategy for tertiary education to be “more 
explicitly aligned with wider government goals for economic and social development” 
and “no longer solely driven by the choices of consumers as it was during the 1990s”.  
Given that public tertiary institutions still actively compete with each other and are 
required to operate as corporates and return TAMU-approved profit margins, the 
Associate Minister of Education, Steve Maharey, overstated the case to claim the 
changes constituted a “paradigm shift”.  Nevertheless, the PBRF-based changes to 
tertiary funding schedules, which are becoming favoured mechanisms for financing 
universities, are a welcome corrective in favour of research.   
 
Taken together with the integration of colleges of education into universities, they 
should also help to prevent a repeat of the kind of EFTS-dictated logic that in the late 
1990s led every teacher education institution to (in most cases, reluctantly) replace 
four-year pre-service teaching degrees with three-year degrees.  The extent to which 
the emerging funding environment will allow a return to the four-year degree remains 
to be seen.   
 
While the increased priority that the PBRF gives to research has some merits, there 
are also quite undesirable consequences of tagging funding to research outputs.  One 
practice that is already under pressure as a direct result of the PBRF is that of 
providing more junior academic staff with easier access to research and conference 
funds.  This collegial approach favoured by a number of academic departments, was 
based on the rationale that senior staff with established research records are usually 
better paid and are considerably more able to access external sources of funding for 
research and conference travel than their more junior colleagues.   
 
The PBRF runs in the opposite direction.  Although the scheme is designed to 
measure institutional research outputs for the purposes of institutional research 
funding, the aggregate scores are derived from individual scores.  They are, however, 
not valid measures of comparing the research performances of individual academics.  
Despite vigilance from the Association of University Staff (AUS) and assurances 
from some senior managers at some universities that PBRF scores will not be applied 
to the comparison of individuals, there is a steady trickle of cases where university 
managers have sought to do just that.  Given the forces at work, it is unlikely that this 
flow will be stemmed. 
 
The model of university management currently in vogue is reminiscent of the model 
of the “multiversity” that Clark Kerr outlined in 1963 in The Uses of the University.  
Single universities are broken into quasi-autonomous units (called, in University of 
Canterbury terminology, colleges) which, in turn, comprise quasi-autonomous 
departments or schools. Each of these units is headed by a manager (a pro-vice-
chancellor or head of department) who is required to deliver a prescribed profit 
margin.  The financial formulae and directives used by this model are designed to be 
experienced by academic and other staff as imperatives to generate greater financial 
surpluses within their particular area. 
 
The old ethos that led academic staff to collaborate and to want to promote the overall 
well-being of the university, is now giving way to much narrower notions of patch 
protection. In the current climate, approaches that might once have been seen as 
positive practices of collegiality, are now more likely to be viewed as negative 
practices of cross-subsidisation. 
 
Given this context, it is not surprising that the growing proportion of university 
funding being channelled through the PBRF is being used to develop systems of 
rewards and incentives for different parts of the university.  The logic driving this 
allocation of PBRF money is that it should be returned to those parts of the university 
in the proportions that they “earned it”. 
 
The obvious extension of this logic, which has been attempted but not yet successfully 
implemented at the University of Canterbury, is for the research and conference 
funding policies within departments to return the funding to those individuals who 
"earned it".  This reorientation of individual research funding, which is being 
promoted in many quarters, would make it even more difficult for younger academics 
to break through.  And this at a time when the lot of a junior academic – surviving 
years of student poverty, saddled with debt and with salaries far lower than those 
earned in comparable professions – is in serious need of enhancement.   
 
Moreover, the more that core university funding becomes fragmented and 
individualised, the harder it becomes to maintain fundamental principles of 
collegiality, that are already being undermined by corporate models of university 
management.  
 
Academics should be encouraged to perform well in every facet of their work, with 
their research, teaching and community contributions being mutually reinforcing.  
However, appointments and promotions criteria have long been weighted towards 
research.  A research degree is a prerequisite for academic appointments but a 
teaching qualification is not.  Academics who are excellent at research but not at 
teaching, hold professorial posts in many universities. However, staff with a lesser 
research record do not get promoted beyond a certain level, no matter how good their 
teaching and other contributions. 
 
By attaching even more prestige and funding to research, the PBRF risks creating a 
gulf between academics with high teaching loads and little time or resources for 
research, and those who will be able to attract sufficient outside research funds and 
PBRF money to minimise their teaching or avoid it altogether.  The PBRF also 
minimises the scope available for innovative approaches to managing the 
teaching/research nexus.   
 
One such model that is currently being implemented at RMIT in Melbourne, is the 
Boyer classification of scholarship.  This is an attempt to take seriously Boyer’s 
argument that scholarship embodies four mutually reinforcing kinds of activity: 
discovery, integration, application, and teaching. Boyer insisted "We need scholars 
who not only skilfully explore the frontiers of knowledge, but also integrate ideas, 
connect thought to action, and inspire students."  The PBRF moves New Zealand 
universities away from the balance and synthesis of the Boyer model, and firmly in 
the direction of the researcher supreme.  This is further illustrated by the apparently 
fizzled out state of what was to be the teaching equivalent of the PBRF. 
 
With the highest ranked researchers now having incentives to focus exclusively on 
PBRF-recognised research, where does this leave students who seek a university 
education?  Are we in danger of drifting towards a situation where undergraduate 
students are taught by contract teachers and have no direct contact with the academics 
who are most actively engaged in research?  Will we end up reminiscing about the old 
days when professors used to give lectures to first-year students, or write articles on 
matters of social importance for the mass media, or serve on school boards of 
trustees?  Perhaps not in the near future, because the prevailing ethos among 
academics remains one that attaches significant value to these other aspects of their 
work.   
 
University league tables are here to stay.  The Times Educational Supplement, for 
example, publishes a global list of the top 200 universities in the world, based on 
citation information and surveys of 1300 academics from 88 countries.  The PBRF is 
closest to Britain’s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), the sixth round of which 
will be produced in 2008.  Germany’s Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
produces a similar research-weighted league table. 
 
However much the government may wish to see the tertiary sector operating in a 
complementary way, league tables, by their very nature, reinforce competition 
between institutions.  Already we are witnessing the emergence of, or at least the 
appearance of prestige gaps between universities.  The moment the final PBRF 
rankings were released, the marketing managers of the institutions that came out on 
top began trumpeting that fact.  With the prestige (and some additional funding) they 
acquired from their early lead, they are now also moving to consolidate and enhance 
their advantage by aiming to retain and attract high PBRF-scoring staff.   
 
At least one university is, for example, using a head-hunting strategy of designing 
advertisements for senior positions to match perfectly the precise areas of expertise of 
particular targeted individuals from other universities.  The move by the University of 
Auckland (the institution leading the PBRF rankings) to break with the process of 
establishing a national collective agreement for university staff could also be 
interpreted as an attempt to defend and consolidate its own position of strength at the 
expense of the general well-being of the New Zealand university sector.  And, 
depending on the relative sizes of the institutions involved, deliberations over 
proposals to merge colleges of education with universities have been influenced by 
the anticipated impact such moves would have on the PBRF ranking of the university. 
 
The PBRF may provide a useful measure for distinguishing between universities and 
other tertiary institutions that do not have a research culture.  However, it is far from 
clear what purpose is served by the inter-university race for prestige that the PBRF 
has fuelled.  In the absence of a more balanced alternative measure, PBRF scores will 
be used by the public to rank the country’s universities. 
 
It may have been just another national myth that New Zealand students could attend 
their local university, safe in the knowledge that the education they would receive 
there would be of a comparable standard to that of any other university.  And, with the 
current managerial and competitive orientation of the country’s universities, this may 
now be so unrealistic that it is barely worth aspiring to.  However, there would be 
something awry to have a university system that would influence public perceptions 
and choices with a status index that was disconnected from the experience of students.  
In other words, students who are enticed to enrol in the country’s top-ranked 
universities are entitled to be taught, and taught well, by those on whose research 
expertise the university’s reputation is based.  This, however, is not an entitlement 
that the current corporate model will deliver. 
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